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RECENT BOOKS 
REFLECTIONS ON THE EXCLUSIONARY 
ZONING OF AMERICAN NATURE 
A. E. Keir Nash* 
MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS. By Joseph L. Sax. Ann Arbor: University of Mich-
igan Press. 1980. Pp. 152. Cloth, $10; paper, $5.95. 
Joseph Sax's Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the 
National Parks deserves more serious scrutiny than does the typical 
pro-wilderness treatise about the optimum future of our nation's 
public lands. That is because beneath its elegant form lies a unique 
argument. Sax's stated central aim is to test the core "preservation-
ist" position concerning nonbusiness1 use of public lands to deter-
mine whether it is a position that Congress, administrative agencies, 
and the public "should be inclined to follow" (p. 3). The question is, 
given the "enormous growth of recreation in recent years" (p. 2), 
whether the national parks, forests, and deserts should "basically be 
treated as recreational commodities, responding to the demands for 
development and urban comforts that visitors conventionally bring 
to them; or should they be reserved as temples of nature worship, 
admitting only the faithful" (p. 2)? The latter view, the preservation-
ist one,2 constitutes a ''bold claim [which] ... has often been con-
cealed in a pastiche of argument for scientific protection of nature, 
minority rights, and sentimental rhetoric" (p. 104). Sax explicitly es-
chews any argument based on either protection of the environment 
* Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara. A.B. 1958, 
Harvard College; M.A. 1961, University of North Carolina; Ph.D. 1968, Harvard University. 
-Ed. 
1. I use the term "nonbusiness use" rather than "recreational use" for two reasons. First, 
at some times preservation means literally locking up a parcel of land against all uses whereas 
at other times it seems to mean preventing all business use but only some nonbusiness uses. 
Second, some nonbusiness users clearly consider their activities closer to the conventional idea 
of a "religious use" than to the conventional idea of "mere recreation," recreation as "fun." 
See L. GRABER, WILDERNESS AS SACRED SPACE (1977); Smith & Watson, New Wilderness 
Boundaries, l ENVTL. ETHICS 51 (1979); Godfrey-Smith, The Value of Wilderness, l ENVTL. 
ETHICS 309 {1979). 
2. In the sociology of recreation literature, and occasionally in this essay, the terms ''wil-
dernist" and "wildernism" are used to distinguish between "preservationism" which "locks 
up" resources completely and "preservationism" which really connotes "usable for wilderness 
experience only." 
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or concern about the quality of life bequeathed to future generations. 
His aim is to "isolate and make explicit the political claim, as it re-
lates to the fashioning of public policy, and leave it to sail or sink on 
that basis" (p. 104). 
Professor Sax first describes the nature of the preservationist's 
political claim. The preservationist is "like the patriot who objects 
when someone tramples on the American flag" (p. 14). He is upset 
not by the physical but the symbolic act. Thus, whatever public 
lands managers may think to the contrary, preservationists are not 
satisfied by mere separation of incompatible uses of nature or by 
mitigation of the "damage done by the most resource-consuming vis-
itors" (p. 13). Though "not an elitist who wants to exclude others, 
notwithstanding popular opinion to the contrary," the preservation-
ist "is a moralist who wants to convert them" (p. 14) to the appropri-
ate uses of nature. He wishes to persuade vacationers to want "to go 
it alone in the mountain wilderness as John Muir did" (p. 15). 
Having described the preservationists' political claim, Professor 
Sax seeks out the rationale underlying the claim. Early park sup-
porters such as John Muir and Aldo Leopold assumed that exposing 
citizens to encounters with nature would induce in all such citizens a 
sense of nature's "harmonies ... so simple and so young ... [as to 
be] easily apprehended by those who will simply keep still and listen 
and look" (p. 17), without adequately explaining either why this 
would happen or why it mattered that it should. In his consideration 
of Muir and Leopold, as later in his treatment of Edward Abbey, Sax 
goes over familiar ground, adeptly, and necessarily to the structure 
of his argument, but without providing major new insights. The 
strength of Sax's analysis lies in suggesting the pivotal role of Fred-
erick Law Olmsted's writing, first in his 1865 report as chairman of 
California's Board of Yosemite Commissioners and, more impor-
tantly, almost two decades later in his management study for the es-
tablishment of a Niagara Falls park. For Sax, Olmsted's writing 
performs two important functions. First, it provides an existential 
justification for the preservationist ideal. It explains why allocation 
of public lands to preservationist purposes is not merely seconding 
economically valuable chunks of earth away from the civil economy 
to serve the odd aims of "nature fakirs" (p. 1). Briefly, Olmsted ar-
gued that nature is valuable as a means of "conscious development 
of aesthetic appreciation." Second, Olmsted explained why public 
appropriations to develop an originally minority preference for pres-
ervation were not undemocratic. Where ancien regime aristocrats 
had held "that the masses were incapable of cultivation," Olmsted 
was "a republican idealist" (p. 24), believing in "the possibility of a 
nation where every individual counted for something and could ex-
plore and act upon his own potential capacities" (p. 24). Providing 
wilderness sanctuaries, to use modem parlance, would advance, 
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rather than retard, the cause of democracy because they would, 
again to use modern parlance, enhance "self-fulfillment." 
To illustrate how a nature experience can advance democracy 
and enhance self-fulfillment, Sax draws from literature "largely ig-
nored . . .. produced not by the scholars, but by the participants 
themselves" (p. 27) - e.g. , Izaak W alton3 and Roderick Haig-
Brown4 on fishing technique and motivations, Galen Rowell5 on 
mountaineering, Ortega y Gasset,6 Hemingway,7 ·and Faulkner8 on 
hunting - as well as less extensively on the related scholarly litera-
ture on "play and culture."9 From these writers, Sax educes related 
motifs that he finds especially significant: the valuing of technique 
over mere technology; immersion of the self in natural detail; es-
chewing of an audience; and, in the case of hunting, a complex bun-
dling of motivations, commencing with atavistic longings but 
restrained by an "ethical structure" that, as in fishing and 
mountaineering, prevents the sport from becoming "a mere will to 
conquer'' '(p. 42). These related motifs suggest how a nature experi-
ence might serve an individual and democracy: the individual deals 
by "self imposed hard labor" in nature with tendencies in society to 
submissiveness; the individual comes to term via contemplation with 
instincts toward dominance; and, nature fulfills the need for urban 
man to absent himself temporarily from civilization, to find harmony 
in nature via "auto-telic" (pp. 55-59) activity and "setting one's own 
agenda." The result, according to Sax, is "self-actualization."10 
Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to explaining the 
policy implications of the nature-experience findings - chiefly 
which activities should be encouraged, which ruled out, and which 
barely tolerated. According to Sax, three types of public wildlands' 
recreation are quite inappropriate. One consists of activities such as 
those at posh ski resorts where the major motivation is being "where 
the action is," rather than reflective recreation. A second is motor-
ized recreation of a passive, spectating sort, whether it is driving 
along manicured scenic roads through the wildlands, or taking tram-
3. I. WALTON & J. COTTON, THE COMPLETE ANGLER (1925 ed.). 
4. R. HAIG-BROWN, A RIVER NEVER SLEEPS (1946). 
5. G. ROWELL, IN THE THRONE ROOM OF THE MOUNTAIN Goos (1977). 
6. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, MEDITATIONS ON HUNTING (1972). 
7. Hemingway, Big Two-Hearted River, in IN OUR TIME 131 (1970 ed.). 
8. Faulkner, The Bear, in THE PORTABLE FAULKNER 199 (M. Cowley ed. 1967). 
9. E.g., R. CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY AND GAMES (1961); M. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, BEYOND 
BOREDOM AND ANXIETY (1975); A. GUTTMAN, FROM RITUAL TO RECORDS: THE NATURE OF 
MODERN SPORTS (1978); J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN 
CULTURE (1949); P. WEISS, SPORT: A PHILOSOPHIC INQUIRY (1969). 
IO. Cf. pp. 57-59, where Sax discusses Carl Rogers's "client-centered therapy" and the 
work of A. H. Maslow. For a critical view of Rogers's theories as they relate to law, see Simon 
Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Fonnalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980). 
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ways to the top of scenic mountains, or driving "insulated" from na-
ture through the wildlands in a large recreational vehicle (pp. 70-81 ). 
The third is motorized off-road recreation. The key considerations 
for Sax appear to be that these nonbusiness activities provide onlY. 
the illusion of an "authentic" nature experience, that they entail 
bringing the "city" and its plastic artifacts, so to speak, into the wild-
lands and thereby violate the essence of the experience; that they are 
the product of artifically stimulated demand (e.g. , by advertising) for 
the particular recreation; and that they fail to encourage at least a 
sufficient measure of "self-reliance." 
With regard to passive, motorized sight-seeing recreation and to 
motorized off-road recreation, Sax argues that the pace of these ac-
tivities is so rapid as to preclude intensive, rather than merely super-
ficial, appreciation of nature. "Intensity of concentration upon the 
natural scene and attentiveness to detail are simply less likely to oc-
cur at forty miles an hour. For this reason it is appropriate to dis-
courage motorized travel" (p. 79). What makes off-road recreation 
so problematic for Sax is not simply the environmental damage done 
or the annoyance to other users, but also the fact that "the satisfac-
tions they produce are directly correlated to the increasing exercise 
of power and of consumption" (p. 75). States Sax: 
If a motorcycle is good, a more powerful and faster cycle is better. . . . 
Unlike some ordinary tourist activities (a picnic or a volleyball game) 
which are simply different from reflective recreation, power-based rec-
reation is antithetical to it. The fly-fisherman, for example, simplifies 
his tools in order to reduce power over his experience. The consumer-
recreationist does precisely the opposite. . . . If the preservationist 
does not succeed in reducing the taste for such activities, he will funda-
mentally have failed. [P. 75.] 
Sax proposes a central policy principle for lessening conflict over 
the nonbusiness use of the public lands. He would force users to 
"unbundle" their recreation demands. The "pure" nature experi-
ence is to be preferred over the hybrid ski-by-day and disco-by-night 
vacation. Persons who concentrate on nature and not on things they 
could do equally well in the megalopolis should be given priority. 
Professor Sax concludes his test-voyage seemingly convinced that 
the preservationists' political claim sails rather than sinks as public 
policy, and that it needs no flotation assistance from arguments 
about the "scientific protection of nature, minority rights, and senti-
mental rhetoric" (p. 104). But is the verdict of seaworthiness com-
pelling? Several objections are likely to be raised by public land 
users with preferences different from those of preservationists and by 
land managers trying to cope with competing demands. 
A first objection pertains to what Sax chooses not to do. Moun-
tains Without Handrails is curiously short, coming from a lawyer's 
pen, on precisely how the policy preferences should be translated 
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into law and rule. Moreover, the book sometimes seems to assert a 
"strongly exclusionary" set of use-rules. But at other times it seems 
merely to advocate a policy of preferring certain uses without com-
pletely prohibiting others. The uncertainty is bound to be frustrating 
to those oriented toward problems of policy implementation. 
A second objection has to do with Sax's use of evidentiary mater-
ials. I am troubled by his failure to make more than occasional ref-
erence to the extensive scholarly literature on the management of 
public lands and on the sociology, economics, and psychology of rec-
reation. For example, he almost completely overlooks the social sci-
ence periodical literature of the past decade and the research that has 
come out of the U.S. Forest Service Research Experiment Stations. 
Yet much in that literature bears on important aspects of Sax's dis-
cussion. These studies include empirical research on: (1) motiva-
tions of different types of wildlands users; (2) relationships among 
work, recreation, and the search for identity or "self-actualization of 
self' that so much concerns Sax as a justification for preservationist 
policy; 11 and (3) relationships between age, education, occupation, 
and income, on the one hand, and recreational use preferences, on 
the other hand. In addition, there are several recreation typologies 
more sophisticated than the simplistic analytic dichotomies ("nature 
appreciation" versus "power motivation"; "self-disciplined roughing 
it" versus "mere comfortable spectating"; "unbundled" versus "bun-
dled" motivations; "authentic" recreation versus "illusory" recrea-
tion) that Mountains Without Handrails utilizes. 12 Much of this liter-
ature i;uggests that recreation motivations, behavior, and their social-
psychological sources are more complex than Mountains Without 
Handrails seems to contemplate. 13 
Because Sax has overlooked most of this research, his argument 
11. See, e.g., the essays in Integrated Inventories of Renewable Natural Resources: Pro-
ceedings of the Workshop, USDA Forest Service General Technical Report RM-55 (1978); 
Outdoor Recreation Research: Applying the Results, USDA Forest Service General Techni-
cal Report NC-9 (1974); reprinted in Proceedings: River Recreation Management and Re-
search Symposium, USDA Forest Service General Technical Report NC-128 (1977); 
Recreational Impact on Wildlands, USDA Forest Service No. R-6-001-1979 (1979). These are 
all large compendia of research under forest service auspices. See also almost any issue of the 
Journal of Leisure Research. 
12. See, e.g., Becker, Perceived Similarities Among Recreational Activities, 8 J. LEISURE Rr.-
SEARCH 112 (1976); Duncan, Leisure Types: Factor Analysis of Leisure Profiles, 10 J. LEISURE 
RESEARCH 113 (1978); Iso-Ahola, Basic .Dimensions of .Definitions of Leisure, 11 J. LEISURE 
RESEARCH 28 (1979); Levy, A Paradigm far Conceptualizing Leisure Behavior: Towards a Per-
son-Environment Interaction Analysis, 11 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 48 (1979). 
13. See, e.g., Brown, Hautaluoma & McPhail, Colorado .Deer Hunting Experiences in 42ND 
NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE TRANSACTIONS 216 
(1977); Clark, Hendee & Campbell, Values, Behaviors, and Co,iflict in Modern Camping Cul-
ture, 3 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 143 (1971); Knopp, Environmental .Determinants of Recreation 
Behavior, 4 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 129 (1972); Potter, Hendee & Clark, Hunting Satiefaction: 
Game, Guns, or Nature?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE CON-
FERENCE 220 (1973). 
1304 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 79:1299 
depends to a heavier degree than otherwise would be necessary on 
balanced utilization of his own intuitions about "people in nature" 
and of what some of the more literary participants have written. 
Unfortunately, there is a marked imbalance between Professor 
Sax's capacity to understand recreational activities that Mountains 
Without Handrails winds up "in favor of' and his incapacity to un-
derstand those it finds inappropriate. For example, in examining 
hunting, Sax looks behind his initial impression that it "at first 
seem[s] wholly built around the conquest of a prey" (p. 34). With 
the help of Ortega y Gasset and Aldo Leopold, he finds that it actu-
ally is not. Hunting is then found to be an appropriate recreational 
activity on public lands. Sax turns next to off-road vehicle recrea-
tion. But he fails to take a similar look beyond apparent motivations 
to allow for the possibility that ORV recreation may not be quite 
what it at first seems to him. To be sure, he allows that "it is possible 
to imagine the lonely cyclist exploring the back country in quite the 
same fashion as the hiker or the horseman" (p. 33). But in the fol-
lowing sentences he states: 
Yet, in fact, the ORV has associated itself in our minds with a style 
of use that is quite at odds with Leopold's description of the ethical 
hunter, Olmsted's contemplative visitor, or Walton's pensive fisher-
man. The ORV has become a symbol of speed, power, and spectacle. 
[Pp. 33-34.] 
Instead of inquiring in the same fashion as before into the moti-
vations of the "ideal" motorcyclist and making them determinative 
(as with Leopold's ideal hunter, Olmsted's visitor, and Walton's 
fisherman), Sax constructs a fact about our minds. In our minds, the 
ORV has become an undesirable symbol. What is going on in the 
cyclists' minds does not matter. It is what we think (for good reason 
or ill) that is going to determine matters, not what they think. 
What is the ground for thinking that this symbol in our minds -
if it was actually there at all before Sax's ipse dixit - should control? 
Suppose that there is some symbol in our minds about some other 
groups of would-be users of our public lands - such as kinky hair or 
a tradition of boiling Christian babies. Should these groups also not 
use our public lands? Our public schools? 
Sax continues: 
The best-known ORV event on the public lands is the Barstow-Las 
Vegas motorcycle race . . . . [T]his mass event, infamous for its de-
struction of the desert ecosystem, its rowdiness, and its vandalism, has 
become an emblem of the ORV. Commercial advertising has rein-
forced this picture, as publicity for off-road vehicles demonstrates: 
"Just put your gang on Suzuki's DS trailbikes. And head for the 
boonies. . . . Peaks or valleys, it's all the same to these rugged off-
road machines." [P. 34.] 
This is curious. I cannot find anywhere in Mountains Without Hand-
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rails the suggestion that the motivations and behavior at mass com-
petition events in other recreational activities should have any 
bearing whatsoever on admission or exclusion of individuals to wild-
lands. Bass-fishing derbies in the Ozarks, Snakeshoots in the Pecos 
- there is no mention of events of this sort in the book. As for the 
Suzuki ad, how many rifle ads promote reflective contemplation of 
nature? How many manufacturers of guns advertise that the barrels 
are not rugged? How many fishing equipment firms advertise that it 
is harder to catch a fish with their flies and plugs? 
Sax's use of the participant literature also demonstrates a ''we-
they" attitude. According to Sax, the fishing and hunting books 
"clearly affirm" the Olmsted proposition that "activities removed 
from mere will to accomplishment and achievement in the eyes of 
others" (p. 35) are "important as a contrast to the values that so often 
dominate our daily lives" (p. 35). In marked contrast, the cycling 
literature, though seeming to speak to a similar contrast, "in practice 
.. diverge[s] sharply" (p. 35). 
The hunting and fishing writers are drawn to activities that transcend, 
without denying, the raw impulsion to exhibit power, win the games, 
pile up a score, and exercise dominion - treating the will to prevail as 
something natural, but at the same time dealing with it as something to 
be faced and measured, rather than yielded to. [P. 35.] 
Whatever exactly it is that this means, clearly it is something that 
hunting and fishing writers do, but alas, ORV writers don't. What it 
is that ORV writers do, and what is ''wrong" with them or what 
they're writing about, is clear from the following sentence: "The pic-
ture . . . is all exhilaration excitement - speed, danger, and domi-
nation" (p. 34). Professor Sax, however, does not marshall sufficient 
authority to prove this dichotomy between ORV writers and hunting 
and :fishing writers. Besides the Suzuki ad, he gives just two quota-
tions and one reference. One quote is to The Snowmobilers Compan-
ion, which is limited to only snowmobiling and which, in the quoted 
passage, was describing only snowmobile racing. Again, where are 
the snakeshoots and the bass-festivities? 
The second quote is from Lee Gutkind's book, Bike Fever: 
The [motorcycle] bellowed as it bounced over the sage, and folded 
down the yellow grass on either side of the wheels. . . . He jetted off 
across the prairie for a while, breathing in the red dust that the wind 
and his wheels were kicking up. . . . He trampled the sagebrush . . . 
he had run into some "whoop-de-do' jumps - a series of brief hills, 
about 25 feet apart. He cranked on, climbed the hill, and disconnected 
from the ground. . . . Each time he hit the top of a hill, his wheels left 
the ground and his stomach ricocheted into his throat .... [P. 34.] 
One problem with Sax's use of this quote is that a single passage is 
not likely to be representative of an entire literature. In this case, the 
quoted "power-oriented" words (which in fact are snippets from 
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pages 230-33, not 211-13 as cited) are not even representative of the 
book they are quoted from. The book is in important measure a 
nature-aware text. A different quote-snipping technique could pro-
duce quite a different result from the very same pages. Thus: 
He ran out of prairie and dropped down a steep hill into the trees, the 
shade and the coolness splashing him like water. He swam in the 
shade for a while . . . . From his position . . . , Red could look down 
and . . . see the fish and the rushing water. Red thought he could 
smell the water, it looked so fresh and pure . . . .14 
A second problem springs from the observation that if one is go-
ing to skimp on sources, it is prudent to use ones that are at least 
arguably "typical." What is the case here? Gutkind's book in fact 
has very little to do with off-road recreation. It is almost entirely the 
narrative of a University of Pittsburgh Assistant Professor of English 
making a cross-country on-road motorcyle trip. And the passage 
Sax quotes describes an aging ranch-hand trying to ride an enor-
mous road-machine offroad while seeking to recover his youthful 
memories of thirty years earlier. Whether the narrative at this point 
is fact or merely the fantasy of an Assistant Professor of English is 
not quite clear. What is clear, however, is that Sax no more manages 
a relevant quote of off-road recreation literature than he does in the 
only other motorcycle "literary source" he refers to. That is Robert 
Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance .15 As anyone 
who has actually read that distinguished literary work should recall, 
it is: (a) primarily about a former Montana State University faculty 
member seeking to recover his personal identity after massive shock 
therapy for schizophrenia; and (b) not at all about off-road recrea-
tion. Pirsig's protagonist, Phaedrus, backpacks a great deal and rides 
motorcycles on the highway a great deal - as well as philosophizes 
almost endlessly. But Phaedrus - in the entire course of the "auto-
biography'' - never even goes near an off-road recreation experi-
ence. 
Law professors do not often select their citations and references 
in such fashion. What is amiss? The difficulty, I surmise, lies in part 
in Professor Sax's uneven insights into different recreations and in 
part in the uneven screening effects of his dichotomizing models of 
recreation. The two reinforce each other and sometimes produce bi-
zarre results, as in Mountains Without Handrails' certainty that 
white-water kayaking is an "appropriate" form of wildlands recrea-
tion versus its doubts about hang-gliding. Hang-gliding is "contro-
versial because it emits an ambiguous message . . . and is to some 
14. L. GUTKIND, BIKE FEVER 230-33 (1974). 
15. R. P!RSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1975). Sax cites to 
Pirsig at page 33 of Mountains Without Handrails in connection with the statement discussed 
supra that "it is possible to imagine the lonely cyclist exploring the back country • • . ." 
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extent . . . the spectacle of thrill seeking, rather like going over the 
falls in a barrel or riding a roller coaster" (p. 35). But also, and posi-
tively, hang-gliding requires "skills . . . such as close attention to 
and understanding of complex wind patterns, which make it seem 
rather like the activity of the hunter or :fisherman who has minimized 
his tools and put himself as close to the margin of experience as 
possible" (p. 35). But exactly what is it about hang-gliding that 
makes it controversial, whereas Grand Canyon rafting without 
power-assists is plainly acceptable? Is it that hang-gliding is more 
like a roller coaster or going over the falls in a barrel than is white 
water boating through rapids? Hard to believe. 
My main purpose here is not to catch Professor Sax out on some 
careless marshalling of sources. Rather it is to suggest that wild-
lands-use policy is not much aided by proceeding to "test" the legiti-
macy of competing recreations in such fashion or by concluding that 
recreationists who don't "play" in exactly the mode and manner that 
preservationists prefer simply display "the psychology of the spoiled 
child" (p. 84). 
A satisfactory test of the "preservationist claim," and of compet-
ing claims, should be concerned less about who contemplates "cor-
rectly" in nature and who does not, less about who seeks thrills and 
who engages in, hard self-discipline, and less about the maximum 
velocity attainable before an intensive wilderness experience is im-
possible. A satisfactory test needs, instead, to examine at least six 
issues. These are: (1) How sound is the claim that ''wildernist" ex-
clusion of other uses passes democratic muster?; (2) How sound is 
the claim that wildernist uses offer "authentic recreational experi-
ence in nature" whereas those uses wildernism disapproves do not?; 
(3) What are the comparative costs to society and economy of wil-
derness versus other uses of public lands?; (4) Should all recrea-
tional users be charged for the costs to the public treasury of their 
activities; (5) Do differences in the socioeconomic status of user 
groups have any bearing on the societal good sense of adopting ''ex7 
clusionary zonings" of American nature?; (6) Finally, what are fair 
mechanisms for minimizing inter-user-group conflicts? 
Although Sax makes an effort to deal with the first pair of these 
issues, he ignores the second pair and gives bare ( and unconvincing) 
nods to the third. 
Let me take the issues Sax ignores first. There are two types of 
reasons why it is unsatisfactory to bypass the issues of "comparative 
costs" and "charging for recreational user costs." One grounds in a 
hard-nosed economics point of view. Preservation of wilderness 
costs government and taxpayer - at least where the "locked-up" 
parcels contain renewable or nonrenewable natural resources. It is 
not adequate to say that "locking up" such resources is just altruisti-
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cally leaving them to future generations. If the resources are nonre-
newable, there is a problem as to fair inter-generational distribution 
not automatically solved by always deciding "pro-wilderness." If 
the resources are renewable, it is possible that members of the pres-
ent generation (at least those who would prefer, e.g., cheaper lumber 
prices to more wilderness) are losing by the lockup without any net 
benefit to the future generation. A "strong" version of this view ar-
gues that free, or nearly free, wilderness amounts to the general pub-
lic providing costless vacations to wilderness recreationists, that 
public policy "ought" to remove these vacation subsidies, and that 
the most efficient solution is to let the free market take over by sell-
ing public lands off to the private sector - whether to developed 
recreation buffs, to wilderness hikers, or to industry. 16 One does not 
have to accept the free market solution in order to concede that a fair 
test of preservationist policy claims ought to include reckoning with 
the question of vacation subsidies and research which suggests that 
though wilderness backpacking may be less expensive to the public 
treasury than dispersed recreations with much beavier environmen-
tal impact, it may be much more expensive than picnic sites, scenic 
roads and vista-viewing facilities. 17 
A second approach would argue that this "hard-nosed" view of 
costs and related benefits is insufficient because it may commit an 
error of omission similar to one of Sax's, though in a rather different 
fashion. Costs and benefits estimates should, on this showing, in-
clude the "off-public-lands costs" to society as a whole of favoring 
exclusionary wilderness zoning and disfavoring other recreational or 
business uses. Put crudely, if keeping four-wheel-drive users off 
public lands, or Auntie Maud from driving on a scenic trails high-
way causes lower productivity the next week on the job or more fam-
ily arguments, these consequences represent costs of "locking up" 
public lands that should at least be considered in any convincing test 
of policy. 
To say this is perhaps to indicate why Mountains Without Hand-
rails at least skirts reckoning with the issue of socioeconomic differ-
ences among user groups and related differences in recreational 
taste. Sax, thus, recognizes that although the preservationist view-
point on wildlands use "implies that we can choose our own recrea-
tion as freely as we can choose our own clothes," "there is a strong 
strain of contrary opinion . . . rarely made explicit in the debate 
16. For such a perspective see J. Baden, The Case for Private Property Rights and Markel 
Allocations, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 26, 29-30; J. Baden & R. Stroup, 
"Priceless Wilderness: A Paradigm Case of Rent Seeking,'' unpublished paper prepared for 
Liberty Fund Conference, Sept. 21-23, 1980. 
17. See Tyre, Average Costs ef Recreation on National Forests in the South, 7 J. LEISURE 
REsEARCH 114, 118 (1975). Tyre's calculations work out to: observation site visits, $0.07 per 
visit; family campgrounds, $1.28 per visitor-day; wilderness areas, $6.03 per visitor-day. 
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over the national parks" (p. 47). If, as that strain ( characterized, for 
example, by Erich Fromm and Irving Howe)18 argues, it is correct 
that "a certain kind of leisure is . . . to be expected from the alien-
ated worker'' (p. 47) or even "psychologically necessary for him" (p. 
47), there is a problem of elitism. If recreation preferences flow from 
position in society - e.g., 
fly-fishing for the professional . . . and snowmobiling for the blue-col-
lar worker - then to embody one style of recreation in public policy, 
and to commit our parklands significantly to it, is to yield a valuable 
and very significant public resource to a very limited segment of the 
population Qimited not just by numbers, but by class as well). [P. 47.] 
Aware of this counter-argument, and duly noting that only five per-
cent of wilderness visits are accounted for by blue-collar workers, 
Sax adverts to the blunt authority of Edward Abbey. Declaring that 
"the dilemma cannot be resolved by data," he quotes Abbey's .Desert 
Solitaire: 
They will complain of physical hardship; these sons of the pioneers. 
[But] once they rediscover the pleasures of actually operating their own 
limbs and senses in a varied, spontaneous, voluntary style, they will 
complain instead of crawling back into a car; they may even object to 
returning to desk and office and that dry-wall box on Mossy Brook 
Avenue. The fires of revolt may be kindled-which means hope for 
us all. [P. 49.] 
Sax, a few pages later, states that though in one sense the "preserva-
tionist is an elitist . . . to the social reformer his message is that he 
can help generate incentives that will lead toward reform of the 
workplace" (p. 53). 
Neither the declaration that the dilemma cannot be resolved by 
data nor the quote of Abbey nor even the statement of the preserva-
tionist's message to the social reformer rises to the level of serious 
analysis. It may be urged that Sax is here trying more to describe the 
preservationist position than to assess it. But so urging only defers 
one difficulty and exposes another. The latter - an endemic one in 
Mountains - is that the boundary between Sax's description of 
preservationism's tenets and his authorial position frequently dis-
solves. Too close to his subject, Sax is often unclear as to whether he 
is describing, agreeing, or analyzing. The difficulty here deferred is 
never addressed in the remainder of the book. One :finishes Moun-
tains without encountering a sophisticated effort either at wrestling 
with the Fromm-Howe viewpoint or at explaining why the social re-
former should not perceive the preservationist's message about 
workplace reform as fatuously shallow industrial sociology . 
18. See E. FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY (1955); Howe, Notes on Mass Cultures, in MAss 
CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS IN AMERICA 496, 499 (B. Rosenberg & D. Manning eds. 1957). 
These works are cited in footnotes 1 & 2, respectively, to Chapter Four of Mountains Without 
Handrails, 125. 
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Sax's prescription for providing fair mechanisms for minimizing 
inter-user-group conflicts is plain enough. As we have earlier noted, 
it originates in a number of dubious dichotomies (e.g. , technology 
versus technique) and eventuates in the not very "neutral principle" 
of motivational and experiential "unbundling." The difficulties with 
this principle are many, but we shall have to limit ourselves to three 
major ones. First it assumes, rather than demonstrates, the superior-
ity of ''unbundling" in a particular direction rather than in another 
and of "unbundled" recreational experiences over "hybrid" ones. 
Second, it not only does not describe what "mechanized recreation-
ists" want to do "in nature," but also does not describe what many, 
perhaps most, of the recreationists whom Sax assumes are largely 
"on the preservationist side" want to do. 19 Finally, in place of analy-
sis of the "right relations" among society, individual, and nature in 
the later twentieth century, it offers two ultimately bogus political 
claims. One is that what wildernists want to do (preservationism 
keeps coming back to this) is to have an "authentic" experience in 
preference to the "illusions" desired by others. The other is that, 
even if the preservationist policy position is elitist, it is not undemo-
cratic. 
Thus we are brought to the two issues pertinent to wildlands pol-
icy-making that Sax does attempt to analyze - the "authenticit;y'' 
claim and the matter of wildernist preservationism's compatibility 
with democracy. The "authenticity versus illusion" claim is one of a 
number of dichotomizing motifs in the book that contains more ap-
peal to preservationist sentiments than unassailable logic or descrip-
tive accuracy. Adequate policy analysis ought to scrutinize the claim 
more closely than Sax does, for it is open to at least two objections. 
First, if the claim is to be grounded in anything more than a 
preservationist ipse dixit about the nature of "authentic experience," 
the analytic path should lead into the thicket of the literature on the 
psychology of "nonwildernist" wildlands experience. Second, the 
analysis needs to address an alternate view of "authenticity" and 
"wildernism." Swiftly put, it is that, in the late twentieth century, 
any wildlands recreational experience seeking to recapture how 
Muir and Wesley Powell experienced nature itself requires an illu-
sion because the recapture is literally impossible in a post-industrial 
society. Further, and ironically, the quest for authenticity misappre-
hends in an oddly anachronistic fashion both what Powell and com-
pany were doing and what wildernists in fact now do. In the first 
place, Powell did not disdain the highest technology then available 
19. See, e.g., Adams, Segmentation ef a Recreational Fishing Market: A Canonical Analysis 
ef Fishing Attributes and Party Composition, 11 J. LEISURE REsEARCH 82 (1979); Hautaluoma 
& Brown, Attributes ef the .Deer Hunting Experience: A Cluster-Analytic Study, 10 J. LEISURE 
REsEARCH 271 (1978). 
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- he hardly set out down the Colorado in Izaak Walton's seven-
teenth-century skiff. In the second place, today's wildernists rarely 
recreate the conditions and technological limitations attending, 
again, Powell's expedition. Few white-water recreationists these 
days face backwards; it is too dangerous. Few mountain climbers 
and backpackers abjure lightweight alloys and synthetic fibers in se-
lecting gear at the suburban wilderness store. Literalist "recapture" 
of past experience simply does not describe what wildernists do. 
Rather they select those contemporary products that happen not to 
offend their particular preferred "illusion." 
In my judgment the most serious analytic defect of Mountains 
Without Handrails lies in the bungle it makes of the attempt to 
square preservationism and democracy. Having dodged the Fromm-
Howe view, it offers two other lines of argument. The first is intellec-
tually embarrassing. Against the contention that the elderly and in-
.firm would be shortchanged by ruling out easy access to the 
wilderness, Sax offers only the declaration - wholly unsupported by 
any systematic evidence - that it is not the formerly active elderly 
or in.firm, but rather development advocates using them as a foil, 
who complain about the shortchanging. The strongest piece of evi-
dence he adduces is the statement: "I myself have climbed in Mon-
tana with a seventy five year old totally blind man . . . and walked 
down and back up the Grand Canyon with a husband and wife in 
their late sixties . . ." (p. 80). So what? 
The second line of argument needs to be taken more seriously, 
for it seeks to controvert the assertion that preservationism is un-
democratic in telling people what they "ought" to want and in push-
ing for policy that would coerce them in that direction. Sax argues 
that coercion is not inherently antithetical to democracy:- Rather, he 
says, part of the faith of democracy is the very capacity of the demo-
crat for self-improvement by disciplined self-cultivation. ''To those 
who ask how anyone else can purport to know what another citizen 
should want" (p. 51), the preservationist responds that "complacent 
acceptance of things as they are is not the hallmark of a democratic 
society'' (p. 51). Just as we do not think it undemocratic to bring 
along a serious book on a vacation or to enroll in a music course and 
so use an external aid to discipline ourselves into self-cultivation, we 
do not think it undemocratic to place ourselves in an analogous posi-
tion in making public policy. Why is this parallel plausible? Be-
cause "[i]ndividual behavior patterns have counterparts in public 
action" (p. 52). Thus, Sax continues, public television is an "obvious 
example" (p. 52) of our willingness ''to coerce (that is, to tax) our-
selves to some degree to be induced to view it, even though we know 
we will probably resist the temptation most of the time" (p. 52). To 
''yield autonomy in this fashion does not undermine commitment to 
a democratic philosophy'' any more than does coming to a doctor 
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and rather than "order[ing] removal of [our] appendix" asking him 
to do his best to make us "healthy again" (p. 53). 
What about the preservationist who tells us to do what we ought? 
He is like the doctor, the "professor of history, or the museum direc-
tor, who speaks for his or her profession" (p. 54). He "boldly asks 
the public to vest similar power in him" (p. 54). Far from being 
undemocratic, he is simply asking "for something akin to the aca-
demic freedom we give a teacher in the class room" (p. 54) - who 
assigns the books he thinks can contribute most to our advancement, 
be they controversial or not. 
This amounts to argumentation by specious analogy. Take the 
analogy to public television. It blurs who is coercing whom. It does 
so by its simplistic unitary ''we," as if in some sort of a national town 
meeting all Americans voted tax appropriations for public television. 
A more plausible explanation is that a minority of persons, dispro-
portionately of high socioeconomic status and political influence, 
succeeded in lobbying for public funding. The analogy flounders 
further by confusing the proportions of public sector versus private 
sector opportunities available in the two recreational areas (televi-
sion wastelands and wilderness wildlands). It ignores the vast differ-
ences between the extent of "coercion" entailed in setting aside one 
or two of a dozen television channels and that entitled in exclusion-
ary claims concerning American wildlands. Of course, the analogy 
could be made more exact - if wildernists were to reduce their 
claims to urging set-asides of only a small fraction of "prime wild-
lands" while leaving the great majority of choice and not-so-choice 
public recreational sites to powerboaters and auto sightseers. Or, it 
could be made such if American public television were to occupy the 
majority of channels, and to contain a steady string of exhortations 
about "appropriate" and "inappropriate" television watching, etc. 
But thus made more accurate the hypothetical loses its force. Or, if 
you prefer, it picks up a different kind of force. It makes the 
preservationist's claim seem too close a cousin to the claims of the 
Moral Majority and to the practices of television broadcasting in 
"people's democracies." 
The analogy to the university professor is similarly specious. An 
individual chooses to go to a particular college, to select a course 
from among many options. Again the analogy could be made more 
exact. It would be more accurate if there were only one federal sys-
tem of higher education, if all courses were required, if all professors 
thought alike, and if all assigned the same books. The analogies 
elide much that should not be elided. And, they have a final diffi-
culty. They are equally serviceable to anyone who wants to make an 
"exclusionary claim" based on the argument that "taking my advice 
will improve your (democratic) character." Imagine: (a) devotees 
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of power-based recreation making claims about the natural suited-
ness of public lan.ds to their goals; (b) a group of "one-worlders" 
wishing to turn over American public lands to free homesteading for 
the Third World's poor, ragged, and hungry; (c) a group of corpora-
tions advocating full-scale energy development; and (d) "animal 
liberationists" arguing that both humans and animals would be bet-
ter off if no one, and they mean no one, sets foot ( or wheel, or keel) 
on the nation's public lands. Each claims to be the professor with 
the best set of character-building and policy-setting books. Unless 
there are reference points external to these books, each separate set 
gives the policymaker little to go on. 
To say this is to point to the central failing of Mountains Without 
Handrails. It is less a test of the preservationist's set of books in 
rigorous comparison with those of others interested in the future of 
America's public lands than it is a friendly and too uncritical reading 
of the preservationist set. The authorial voice emanates from a loca-
tion closer to that of the advocate than to that of the judge. Moun-
tains Without Handrails declares near the outset that it is going to 
test the preservationist political claim. Well before the end, the test 
looks less like a test and more like a lawyer's argument for his client. 

